We thank
for their generous support and cooperation.
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| The
Academy Today - Issue 1, Vol.1, April 2007 |
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NEC on a Rope?
The Need for Good Leadership |
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Just
as the country emerges from one bruising unsettled political
stand-off over the extension of the House of Elders, Somaliland
finds itself once more plunged into a constitutional crisis.
The President and the House of Representatives are at odds over
the nomination and approval of a new National Electoral Commission,
threatening to mark one more round of protracted political stalemate.
So far, the extension of the mandate of the previous National
Electoral Commission by the House of Representatives on February
23 marked the peak of this latest political disagreement. The
controversial move set the stage for yet another constitutional
showdown between the President and the House, to take place
before the Supreme Court. It resulted from a chain of events
that began with a dispute over the process of selection of candidates
for a new National Electoral Commission, following the expiry
of the former commission’s term in January. From then on, the
situation worsened in a series of tit-for-tat moves by the rival
camps.
In the already polarised and entrenched political environment,
where the key stakeholders perceive each other with deep distrust,
and voices of reason are all too rare, a divisive performance
in the formation of such an important and sensitive body as
the National Electoral Commission may have major negative bearing
on the democratisation process, for a number of reasons: firstly,
elections looming large in Somaliland include the highest political
office, the presidential post – thus, a lot is at stake, requiring
broad acceptance of the process.
Secondly, there is a perception that already the selection process
of the NEC favours the incumbent government: the president nominates
three candidates for the commission, the House of Elders (the
Guurti) –often seen to be aligned with the president– nominates
another two candidates, and the two opposition political parties
are supposed to nominate only two. With such a system, it is
even more vital that due process is seen to be followed, with
specific attention paid to securing general confidence in the
new commission. The third and final point is that a system in
which the Opposition plays only a minor role in nomination,
but is able to approve or reject each individual candidate through
exercise of its majority in the lower House, a process that
merely adheres to the rules without proactively attempting to
build consensus with the Opposition is likely to result in stalemate;
bogging Somaliland’s political system down in a time-consuming
side battle, threatening to stall the electoral time table as
well as major tasks such as voter registration.
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Running
elections involves the management of sensitive materials,
which needs a broadly accepted NEC.
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In
the eyes of these challenges, the question is therefore how
the diverse stakeholders with competing interests can achieve
a competent, experienced and regionally-, clan- and gender-balanced
commission that is broadly acceptable to all.
The best hope to overcome these challenges, as in previous situations,
would be Somaliland’s traditional approach through consensus-based
politics. In this particular case, it means holding a joint
consultation of the stakeholders under the leadership of the
President in order to reach a compromise on the nominees within
the legal framework, but before they are submitted to the House
for confirmation. Kulmiye, the leading opposition party, has
long stated its acceptance of such consultations. Unfortunately,
they never took off. Instead, the President, the Guurti and
the chairman of UCID party (the other opposition party), nominated
their respective choices, and Kulmiye withheld its nomination
in protest, together triggering the above-mentioned tit-for-tat
controversy.
Meanwhile, various quarters of society raised serious objections
over the composition of the list of nominees. Women’s groups
denounced the exclusion of women from the announced nominees,
fearing that they might not even have one representative in
the new commission. Elements of two major clans from the east
of Somaliland, who were not included among the six nominees,
made no secret of their opposition to the confirmation of the
six candidates, unless the list was revised. Furthermore, the
absence of all the previous members from the proposed new commission
was a cause of concern for many observers. Not least, the donor
community, who invested heavily in the previous elections, is
deeply disappointed by the apparent lack of at least minimal
continuity, and the resultant loss of hard-won experience.
The observed imbalances in the existing list of nominees put
Kulmiye in an awkward position, and provided no good options.
The party would have to kill three birds with one stone, that
is: To come up with a nominee that addresses the gender issue,
and the two missing major clans, and to safeguard experience.
Selecting a female nominee from the Habar Jeclo clan certainly
would have pleased women’s groups and probably Kulmiye’s main
supporters, but the absence of the Dhulbahante from the incoming
NEC would have politically alienated them further. The opposition
party came under pressure from all interested sides, ultimately
dividing the party leadership and making it even more difficult
for Kulmiye to come up with a compromise choice. |
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Next
Stop: Supreme Court.
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Despite
the growing grievances over the composition of the list of proposed
commissioners, the President forwarded the six nominees to the
House of Representatives for confirmation. Initially, and with
an overwhelming majority, the House of Representatives refused
on procedural grounds to table the list for a confirmation hearing:
It criticised the list as incomplete, and therefore referred
it back to the eligible parties. The House resolution, which
had the backing of MPs of all three political parties, was meant
to send a strong message to the stakeholders, including the
President, to get their act together and to come up with an
experienced, competent commission, balanced in terms of gender
and region/clan and acceptable to all.
But hopes that the window of opportunity resulting from the
House’s decision would be used to resolve this controversial
issue were dashed when the Parliament, on the initiative of
a group of Kulmiye MPs, took another controversial step: The
lower chamber of parliament extended the term of the old commission
by two years after the legal advisor of House endorsed the move.
Key opposition figures saw their extension of the Commission
as an equivalent to the contested extension of the Guurti, which
the President had supported earlier. Some MPs argued that their
support for the move was intended “to raise the stakes“ and
force the President and the Guurti to compromise with the Opposition
and the Parliament.
Observers immediately doubted that this development would compel
the President and the Guurti to negotiate or give in, rather
seeing it as further escalation of the conflict. Meanwhile,
many believe that a reasoned decision to reject all or some
of the forwarded nominees in the course of a formal review process
in the House, where the opposition parties claim to have the
necessary votes, would more effectively force the President
and the Guurti either to nominate alternative candidates or
to compromise in other areas. But for some reason, Kulmiye and
the Parliament do not appear to have considered this option.
Many people, including moderate members of Kulmiye, saw the
controversial extension of the old NEC as a strategic mistake
and counter-productive. It looked obvious that the party’s interest
lay with the progression of the electoral process in order to
hold the crucial elections on schedule. The tit-for-tat tactics
however risk derailing the process and providing the incumbent
government with justifications to postpone elections. Furthermore,
a continuation of the political “trench war“ is ultimately seen
to challenge the country’s political stability. |
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Shukri
Bandare, the only woman in the previous NEC, in action during
the parliamentary polls in 2005.
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Each
side has its own standpoint on the ongoing crisis. Senior government
officials close to the President maintain that his three nominees
were selected in good faith and that he had no influence whatsoever
on the Guurti nominations, as charged by critics. Furthermore,
the President reportedly felt that the opposition had the opportunity
to block any nominees – including his – in the course of the
process at the House of Representatives, where they have the
majority. He is believed to favour the plain legal procedure
over pre-procedural consultations, even if this is unlikely
to produce a broadly accepted NEC.
On the other hand, Kulmiye’s hardliners offer their own rationale.
They perceive the current deadlock as an extension of many previous
confrontations, where the President mostly succeeded in getting
things his way. The stalemate is not considered an isolated
incident, but part of the pattern in which the government allegedly
disregards the opposition political parties’ viewpoints and
concerns, failing to consult on sensitive national issues in
which they have a stake: “the President does not recognise or
understand that the political parties are national institutions
that have a role in policy-making“, stated a senior official
in Kulmiye. These elements in Kulmiye believe that they have
the right to play hardball with the President and to confront
him head-on “as a natural reaction“ because they feel provoked.
In wider perspective, however, it seems that it is one thing
to give the President a hard time, and quite another to achieve
tangible concessions from him.
The stand-off over the formation of a new Commission took another
twist when the government actively discharged the old members
of NEC from the scene. This became a focal point of political
wrangling on February 19, as the President instructed the old
commissioners to hand over the office to the Director General
of the NEC. In their response, the old commissioners characterised
the President’s approach as inappropriate and disrespectful.
They also advised the President that their legal status was
still in dispute, since the House had extended their term. Finally,
they stated they would only hand over the office to another
legal commission, rather than to a representative of the executive.
Political observers saw this last public statement of the old
NEC as unnecessarily provocative, further aggravating the situation. |
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Former
NEC Chairman Axmed Xaaji Cali Adami, UCID Chairman Faysal
Cali Warabe and Vice-President Axmed Yuusuf Yaasiin (from
left to right) at the signing of the Code of Conduct for the
Parliamentary Elections. Consensus-based politics were the
key to resolving many earlier challenges of democratisation.
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After
abortive attempts, including by the Academy, to reconcile the
two sides, the President ordered the seizure of NEC’s premises.
Three officials: the Head of the Civil Service Commission, the
Auditor General, and the Accountant General, entered NEC’s premises
in the absence of the old Commission and, along with the Director
General, took stock of the furniture and the other equipment
in the offices. Then they sealed the buildings and officially
handed the responsibility to the DG of NEC.
This seizure and removal of the old commissioners could not
have come at a worse time for the government, since it was already
under pressure for its jailing and contested trial of three
journalists who had been arrested on charges of slandering the
President and his family. Though the public reaction to these
incidents was rather mute, responses from the Somaliland Diaspora,
and the International Community, who were closely monitoring
the situation, were outspoken. In particular, the Diaspora noted
that these unfortunate incidents marred Somaliland’s democratic
credentials and observed Somaliland to be on a slippery slope
towards autocratic rule. As for the International Community,
it has been reported that they have expressed their deep concerns
to the government, as well as to both chambers of Parliament,
through personal channels, and some are in the process of reviewing
their support to Somaliland’s democratisation process.
So far, mediation efforts to break the deadlock did not bear
fruit. From today’s perspective, two steps appear necessary
to clear the way for a breakthrough on this issue: 1. The Supreme
Court’s nullification of the old NEC’s extension by the House
of Representatives. This is likely to happen any time soon.
2. The rejection of all or some of the six current nominees
by the House in the course of a formal review and confirmation
process. Realizing this second step looks far more difficult,
because it is not clear whether the opposition or the wider
House is ready to accept a review of only six candidates. However,
from the current position, it seems to be the only approach
that would clear the road for subsequent consensus building,
as the President argues that, for political reasons, he cannot
withdraw his submitted nominees prior to negotiation. Ultimately,
the opportunity for consultation would therefore arise only
if and when the House rejects all or many of the current nominees.
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Seal
at the doors of the NEC premises – the old commission is out
and a new one is not within sight.
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In
any case, March has now passed and the countdown to the local
elections in December and presidential elections next April
is on, yet the process is flagging. With no NEC in place or
within sight, the voter registration process is effectively
dead for the moment. The country has to face the prospect of
local as well as presidential elections without prior voter
registration.
The necessity to nominate a new NEC at this time has been known
for years in advance. The on-going debacle is a classic example
of the failure of Somaliland’s leadership – both in the government
camp and on the opposition side – to reach a collective decision
on a vitally important matter for the sake of national interest.
Instead of cooperating responsibly to solve this pressing problem,
we find the leadership engaged in a partisan point-scoring game.
Moreover, with the NEC ’on a rope’, Somaliland’s sovereign cannot
hold representatives accountable in a timely and qualitative
manner.
Particularly at this critical moment in Somaliland’s history,
we cannot afford to compromise on the fairness, inclusiveness
or integrity of the democratic process. The future of this country
is our common responsibility and we must proceed in a spirit
of mutual respect, tolerance and accommodation. It is sincerely
hoped that this will be taken into account as all parties strive
to ensure that the window of opportunity is reopened. |
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A
Note from Mohammed Saeed Gees,
Executive Director of the Academy for Peace and Development |
In
close collaboration with its principal partner INTERPEACE, the
Academy for Peace and Development (APD) has been involved at
the heart of Somaliland’s efforts to build peace and a democratic
state since its inception in 1999. At this stage, we are pleased
to launch The Academy Today, a newsletter intended to
provide you with timely, informative, incisive and objective
analysis of “where things stand“ in Somaliland’s continuing
state and peace building process. The Academy Today aims to
bring issues to the floor that otherwise threaten to escape
the attention of decision-makers and the wider public. By placing
particular emphasis on longer-term developments, and comparing
Somaliland’s challenges with those of other young democracies,
we seek to take topics from the broader and non-partisan angle
that we often find missing from the short-lived world of today’s
media and politics.
Yet after eight years of existence, it is also time for the
Academy as an institution to inform the public more regularly
of highlights in its activities and notable developments in
its programmes. In 2006, we have taken a first step by launching
our new website at » http://www.apd-somaliland.org
We invite you to regularly check out the latest news about the
Academy online. The page also allows you and others to subscribe
to the mailing list that we use to circulate the electronic
version of The Academy Today and other current information
such as invitations to our public events.
Please send your feedback to: newsletter@apd-somaliland.org
Your
inputs may be published in the next issue of The Academy
Today. |
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Analysis:
The Dilemma of Introducing Constitutional Reform |
Somaliland’s
constitution is under constant strain from various fronts. All
too often, the power struggles between the executive and legislative
branches over constitutional issues expose its serious limitations
and deficiencies in crucial areas, such as the separation of
powers and strong checks and balances. As a product of complex
compromise between the executive and legislative branches in
the mid-1990s, many aspects of the constitution fail to provide
satisfactory or even clear solutions to challenges. Furthermore,
the constitution contains numerous loopholes, omissions and
contradictions. The development of clear and detailed secondary
laws has not progressed very far, thus, regulatory frameworks,
procedures and enforcing mechanisms remain undefined or in doubt.
Often times, these are the roots of constitutional disputes
that lead to protracted political stalemates and tension.
Furthermore, this situation is deteriorating because the safeguarding
and mediating institutions of the constitution are losing their
effectiveness. In the Somaliland context, the Guurti played
a prominent and widely recognised mediating and stabilising
role for a long time. While Guurti members and supporters maintain
that the current Guurti would continue to play a stabilising
role for some time to come, it has come under serious criticism
following its self-granted mandate extension by four years in
May 2006. Sceptics of the Guurti argue that an increasing politicisation
of the Guurti has undermined its credibility as an honest and
neutral broker between competing factions. The dispute over
the mandate extension and the continuing lack of an electoral
mechanism for the Guurti have also placed its future political
status under scrutiny. The role of the Guurti in the new political
arrangement - next to a popularly elected lower House of Parliament
and President – is therefore under review.
Moreover, the judiciary - more specifically the Supreme Court
and the Constitutional Court; the institutions that typically
manage constitutional conflict in democratic societies - have
rarely played an important role in the arbitration of such disputes.
But with the increasing heat of the power struggles between
legislative assembly and executive branch, it is being tested
further, and is proving ever more unable to live up to the challenge.
In the eyes of the public, the judiciary has so far proved neither
independent nor competent to resolve constitutional disputes.
The courts’ capacity aside, this is also a result of the lack
of frameworks and mechanisms of proper judicial review, including
a mechanism to ensure that the respective rulings are actually
implemented. |
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President
Riyale leaving the new offices of the Parliament: The Constitution
lays out the relations between the executive and the legislative.
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For
Somaliland’s fledgling democracy, this constitutional environment
is very discouraging. There is a need for a constitutional reform
in order to continue the development of a positive regulatory
framework for Somaliland’s politics, and to strengthen the very
foundations of its constitutional democracy.
The call for constitutional reform is not new. Already in 2003,
barely two years after the constitution was ratified, analysts
familiar with Somaliland politics were recommended a comprehensive
constitutional review to further the country’s democratisation
process. During the same year, a law review committee established
by the Ministry of Justice with the help of UNDP identified
the need to review Somaliland’s constitution. The committee
categorized the task into three broad challenges, the need to:
1. Remove the transitional provisions, 2. Adapt ‘the text’ or
the language used in some provisions and 3. To change ‘the substance’
of some provisions.
But it was not until November 2004 that a first public debate
on the issue took place, when the Academy for Peace and Development
(APD) – based on months of consultations and discussions with
key stakeholders – presented a research and dialogue proposal
on constitutional review and reform to a National Project Group
Meeting in Hargeisa. As part of the APD/INTERPEACE Dialogue
for Peace, the conference brought together more than 80 delegates
from the central and local government, the Houses of Parliament,
civil society, and other concerned groups. The aim was to have
a first national debate on the issue of constitutional review
and to garner the support of all the key institutions for APD
to facilitate this national exercise. The Vice-President of
Somaliland, who opened the two-day meeting, weighed in with
strong arguments in support of the proposal, stating that “our
constitution is responsible for most of our political ills.“
It may have been only his personal view and position, because
at the end of the conference, the proposal of constitutional
review and reform was abandoned, following stiff opposition
from the government. Three prominent ministries objected in
an unusually strong manner, implicitly indicating how deeply
worried they were about the proposed process. Among their claims
was that the country could not afford a constitutional review
during an election year, and that this sensitive matter should
be left for the incoming elected House of Representatives to
deal with.
Initially, the results of the parliamentary elections in 2005
seemed to be a cause for optimism on the issue. Having the opposition
political parties winning control of the House of Representatives
seemed to offer the best chance of initiating reforms, possibly
including a constitutional review. Many members of the opposition
camp voiced enthusiasm for more and deeper reforms in order
to develop better checks and balances between the three branches
of government. But after one year in control of the House, the
opposition has little to show in terms of political reform,
except for a number of resolutions and motions calling on the
executive to adhere to the constitution. |
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Hopes
of reform were high when the new MPs took their oath in November
2005.
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Even
if the opposition in the House of Representatives had initiated
such reforms – as many had hoped – the chances of pushing these
reforms through appear slim. Any changes introduced by the House
– particularly the ones that would curb the executive’s power
– would likely be rejected by the Guurti (the Upper House) and
the President. Furthermore, the opposition MPs are unable to
override such vetos since they do not hold two-thirds of the
total vote. Nevertheless, critics argue that it would have been
a positive development if the House had at least initiated a
reform process, albeit its seemingly minimal chances of endorsement.
Most importantly, such efforts would have enhanced the image
of the House and would expose the executive to a substantial
debate. Vigorous, evidence-based discussions in the public arena
and the development of detailed proposals on such reforms in
the House could have made it much harder for the Guurti and
the Government to reject reforms in total.
If Somaliland’s fledgling democratisation process is to be continued
and deepened, and if the country should be spared further political
stalemates, political reform including a constitutional review
appears inevitable. Therefore, a comprehensive constitutional
review is also among the recommendations put forward in the
recent APD/INTERPEACE publication on the parliamentary elections
(“A Vote for Peace“ » http://www.apd-somaliland.org)
It is obvious that any specific measures of constitutional reform
will always draw opposition from one quarter and support from
another. But the key challenge at this stage remains to initiate
a constitutional review and reform at all. Those who benefit
from the status quo are likely to maintain a fundamental allergy
to the very idea of change. For them, constitutional reform
represents a threat to their influence or privileges. Others
might belittle the idea as the desire of a few reform-minded
‘idealists’. Hardliners among the opposition political parties
would probably see it as their chance ‘to get back at the government’.
These various views not only complicate the initiation of any
constitutional reform process, they also indicate the covert
sources of opposition or support that proposals will receive,
and the extent to which they may become the culmination of intense
political conflict.
Therefore, it will be essential to first bring all the key actors
on board. An ad-hoc joint Constitutional Working Group could
first lay the ground for a preliminary constitutional review.
Their mandate could include: proposing workable ground rules;
conducting a rough preliminary review of the constitution; and
identifying key contradictions, omissions and areas of concern.
One way of going about the actual review might be to start with
the least controversial issues, such as the changes that are
merely of a technical nature – agreed editing to some of the
wording, or removal of outdated transitional provisions. Getting
started and building the necessary confidence amongst the relevant
stakeholders could then open up the prospect of tackling the
real bones of contention. |
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APD
Insight:
The Burco Dilemma Striking a Balance between Troubleshooting
and Peace Building |
Sporadic
clan confrontation in some parts of the country remains a security
challenge to Somaliland. There has been a notable surge in the
number of tribal conflicts in February 2007, including the potential
to spread into Somaliland’s major urban centres such as Hargeisa
and Burco. Most of them are over land and revenge killings.
There were about four such clan disputes involving Somaliland’s
rival clans in and out of Somaliland’s territory. The first
involved two sub-clans of Warsangeli and Sa’ad Yonis of Habar
Yonis, in Sanaag region. The accidental killing of a Sa’ad Yonis
man in a car ambush by a Warsangeli man triggered this stand-off.
In Sool region, disputes over land have led to clashes between
members of Habr Jeclo and Dhulbahante sub-clans, which led to
the death of four people and the wounding of nine. Another sub-clan
conflict in Saaxil region pitted elements of Ciisse Musse (Habar
Awal) and Habr Jeclo sub-clans against each other, claiming
two lives. Finally, the incident causing the greatest fatalities
took place around the town of Daroor, in Ethiopia’s Somali Region
near the border with Somaliland, and it was between rival members
of Habr Yonis and Eidagale sub-clans. According to news reports,
43 people were killed, 50 wounded, and scores of others fled.
Though it took place inside Ethiopia, Somaliland bore the brunt
of the conflict. Hospitals in Hargeisa and Burco received dozens
of wounded.
Many such confrontations are resolved through the mediation
of the traditional elders, since the law enforcement institutions,
and regional and local authorities are ill-equipped to manage
these conflicts. Though the government allocates over fifty
percent of its national budget to the security sector, in most
areas of Somaliland, the force does not have adequate resources
for even basic operational needs. Many stations lack transport
and communications to keep order in case of such emergencies.
But traditional mediation also requires resources to quickly
dispatch carefully selected elders to the conflict zone, and
the means to do so are hard to find. Whenever a conflict cannot
be resolved locally, posing the danger of serious escalation,
regional and local authorities and civic leaders lose a great
deal of valuable time soliciting funds and other support for
such peace missions. In desperation, they leave no stone unturned,
but the danger of further violence looms until they succeed
in mobilising the necessary resources. |
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Many
conflicts are over grazing and browsing land.
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| As
a result, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), particularly
at its recently established office in Burco, receives a continuous
stream of funding requests from regional governments, local
authorities and civic leaders seeking support for interventions
in the name of peace. The APD Burco office was established in
2005 with the help of INTERPEACE to initiate political dialogue
in the region, particularly in the city of Burco. The aim is
to rebuild community relationships at all levels, a process
critical to the consolidation of peace and security in the Central
and Eastern part of the country. These programmes pursue mid-
to long-term goals in peace building – but recurrent immediate
crises overwhelm the Academy with demands for direct funding
and support for short-term mediation missions. APD faces difficulties
providing such assistance to what sometimes are critical peace
missions, because they are outside of its funding mandate. At
times, the scenario puts the Academy in an uneasy situation:
providing direct support can only be done from the Academy’s
meagre own resources, affecting the organisation’s possibilities
to invest and develop. But failure to assist crucial peace initiatives
entails an even greater risk of damaging the trust of communities
or losing the confidence of the public. |
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APD’s
Burco Team.
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In
such situations, particularly when the mission in question is
very critical, APD has to improvise in order to come up with
some kind of direct support. Through this pragmatism, the Academy
was able to provide assistance in resolving two of the recent
conflicts. In Sanaag, APD not only gave direct support, but
some of its staff also went to participate personally in the
mediation process. Addressing the conflict in Togdheer, the
Burco Office contributed transport for the mediation mission.
Similarly, the Academy has provided direct assistance and at
the same time led efforts to solicit funds for the abortive
mission to Daroor. The latter failed after the Ethiopian authorities
took over the management of the conflict.
Several reasons explain why the APD office in Burco attracts
the attention of community leaders who seek this assistance.
The full name of the Academy contains the word ‘Peace’. Many
see the organisation as a peace agency responsible for “fixing
the peace“. APD’s past and present activities, facilitating
political dialogue among regional actors, partly contributes
to this misunderstanding. But ultimately, it is a matter of
context: APD’s mission is primarily to deal with the structural
causes of conflict, so that future violent conflict can be prevented.
Addressing specific, immediate conflicts through mediation or
facilitation of ceasefires remains the mandate of traditional
and government leaders. Nevertheless, it is clear that the two
challenges are interdependent. In a nutshell, efforts to rebuild
community relationships cannot be successful while bullets are
flying, just as a ‘fire-fighter’ approach to conflict resolution
is unsustainable. Thus, in those parts of Somaliland where small-scale
violent conflict continues to be a common and regular problem,
the Academy is challenged to strike an effective balance between
assisting in short term ‘troubleshooting’ and in long-term peacebuilding
efforts. |
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| New
Dialogue for Peace Publications & Films |
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| APD
and INTERPEACE have finalised three reports summarising the
findings of three entry point programmes that were undertaken
under the Dialogue for Peace in Somaliland since 2004. The full
reports (in English) as well as Executive Summaries (in English
and Somali) are available at our website: » http://www.apd-somaliland.org/news/20061112dfppublic.htm |
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A
Vote for Peace.
How Somaliland successfully hosted its first Parliamentary Elections
in 35 years. September 2006. English, 74 pp.
» Download
|
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Local
Solutions.
Creating an Enabling Environment for Decentralisation in Somaliland.
October 2006. English, 43 pp.
» Download
|
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From
Plunder and Profit to Prosperity and Peace.
Resolving Resource-based Conflict in Somaliland. November 2006.
English, 43 pp.
» Download
|
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| APD
and INTERPEACE have finalised three documentary films on three
entry point programmes that were undertaken under the Dialogue
for Peace in Somaliland since 2004. They are available in English
and Somali from APD's offices. We will inform you through the
website and The Academy Today once we have developed
a channel to distribute the films outside of Somaliland. |
A Vote for Peace
(Doorashada Golaha Baarlamanka) (2006)
Documentary on the Parliamentary Elections in 2005.
41 min., Somali and English version. |
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Local Solutions
(Maamul-daaddejinta) (2006)
Documentary on Decentralisation in Somaliland.
21 min., Somali and English version. |
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From Plunder and Profit to Prosperity and Peace
(Boob iyo Bursi ku doorso Nabad iyo Badhaadhe) (2006)
Documentary on Resource-based Conflict in Somaliland.
31 min., Somali and English version. |
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| |
At
the end of 2006, the Culture and Communication Unit of the Academy
completed a participatory video on “Minority Exclusion in Somaliland“
and a video guide for participatory video training, in cooperation
with Oxfam Novib (also see Short News).
Furthermore, the C’n’C Unit currently produces a short film
about UNDP’s Small Arms Registration Project in Somaliland.
The purpose of the film is to raise awareness and to encourage
society to legally register their their privately owned weapons. |
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Short
News:
People
and Programmes
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» Dialogue
for Peace, Phase II
» New
Projects at the Academy
» Participatory Video at WSF
» Boobe Publishes SNM Book
» Team News
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INTERPEACE
and APD kick off Dialogue for Peace, Phase II
Following the successful conclusion of the first phase of the
'Dialogue for Peace', INTERPEACE and APD decided to continue
to work on the three entry points that constituted the previous
Dialogue for Peace:
- Democratisation
- Decentralisation
- Natural
Resource-based Conflict
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| Launch
of the Publications of the Dialogue for Peace, Phase I
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New
Projects at the Academy
In addition to and complementing the existing projects, funding
for three new projects has recently been secured:
- Women
in Peace Building and Decision-Making
- ‘Mapping’
the Peace Processes in Somaliland’s history
- Local
Governance and Land-based Conflicts (Capacity Building Project)
The
next issue of the newsletter will introduce these new projects
in detail.
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APD
Office in Hargeisa.
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Participatory
Video on Minority Exclusion at World Social Forum
At the end of November 2006, non-governmental organizations
from Hargeisa, Mogadishu, Garowe and Baidoa took part in a Participatory
Video (PV) workshop by Oxfam Novib conducted with the support
of the Institute for Development Studies (UK) and ‘Equal in
Rights’ (Netherlands) in Hargeisa. The aim of PV is to empower
communities through stimulating reflection and to experience
exchange on rights-based development. During the workshop, the
Somaliland Team, composed of members of the Academy for Peace
and Development (APD), NAGAAD, Somaliland National Disability
forum (SNDF), and Voice of Somaliland Minority Women Organization
(VOSOMWO), prepared a PV titled “Minority Exclusion in Somaliland“.
The 30-minute video focuses on the nature, causes and possible
solutions of exclusion and discrimination based on gender and
disability. Together with the videos of the other regional teams,
this film was presented at the “Human Dignity and Human Rights
Caucus“ of the World Social Forum (WSF) from January 20-25,
2007 in Nairobi. |
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Opening
Ceremony, World Social Forum 2007, Nairobi
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Boobe
Publishes a new Book about the SNM and the Restoration of Somaliland’s
Sovereignty
“Dhaxal-reeb: Horaad“ - “Leaving a Heritage“ is the second book
published by Boobe Yuusuf Ducaale, APD’s Programme Coordinator
and former Secretary of Information and Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Somali National Movement (SNM). It is a collection
of long serial articles that Boobe had written for websites
and newspapers between May 2002 and December 2006. These articles,
both historical and analytical, concern the liberation war of
the SNM and the overall reconstruction of Somaliland. The book
is rich and eventful and covers a variety of themes related
to history, politics, literature, culture and the life histories
of the leaders and some of the rank and file of the decade-long
liberation war of the SNM. The author describes "Leaving a Heritage"
as an appetizer and a prelude to an upcoming historical book
on the saga of the SNM, which will be called “The days that
have passed us“. The latter will be printed soon as much of
it has already been drafted.
In 2006, Boobe Yuusuf Ducaale had already published the 2nd
Edition of ‘The Life and Poetry of Timacadde’. The book has
recently won the ‘Book of the Year 2006’ Medal of the Somaliland
Writer's Association, awarded on March 3, 2007 in Stockholm,
where Boobe will be represented by Cabdillaahi Fidar and Cabdillaahi
Faarax.
Details of the latest book: ‘Dhaxal-reeb: Horaad’ (Leaving a
Heritage, Volume I), 517 pages in Somali, published in 2007
by Flamingo Printing Press in Addis Ababa.
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Boobe
Yuusuf Ducaale
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Team
News:
Fellow wraps up Successful Stay with the Academy
Christina Rosendahl, a student of Political Science from
the German University of Leipzig recently completed her 7 week
fellowship at the Academy for Peace and Development.
Her stay in Hargeisa mainly served to conduct interviews for
her Diploma Thesis on donor policies in failed and re-emerging
states, focusing on the European Union’s engagement with Somalia
and Somaliland. As part of her engagement with the Academy,
Christina will write a discussion paper on “The European Union
in Somaliland – Development Assistance in an Unrecognized State“.
We are glad that Christina stayed with us as the first of a
series of fellows who are planning to visit Somaliland this
year. |
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| Christina
with APD Team |
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| Calendar |
April
(to be announced) |
Civic
Forum on the Media Law |
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| April
18 |
Launch
of Boobe Yuusuf Ducaale’s New Book: “Dhaxal-reeb: Horaad“
- “Leaving a Heritage“ at the University of Hargeisa |
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| April
27 |
Hargeisa
Readers’ Club, Maansoor Hotel |
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| July
2007 |
Decentralization
Entry Point:
Working Group for Land and Revenue Management |
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| Imprint |
This
newsletter is published by the Academy for Peace and Development,
Hargeisa, Somaliland,
in partnership with INTERPEACE.
Views expressed above are the sole responsibility of APD. For
further information, please visit our website at: http://www.apd-somaliland.org,
where we also provide a pdf version of The Academy Today.
To subscribe to or unsubscribe from the Academy’s electronic
mailing lists, including the newsletter, visit http://www.apd-somaliland.org/mailing.htm
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in
cooperation with:
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